Redundancy is the existence of more than one means for performing a given function, Similar to many robust biological systems [6] , strategically robust systems use multiple redundant pathways, in this case so that saboteurs cannot benefit by knocking out single components. This approach might be particularly valuable for systems that need to be strategically robust against evolving enemies. By deploying multiple redundant defense pathways, the host can influence the evolutionary trajectory of a pathogen population. Redundant defense mechanisms reduce the selective advantage to the pathogen of knocking out a single mechanism [3] . This, in turn, greatly increases the difficulty of the adaptive search problem that the pathogen faces when looking for a weak point in the defenses of the host.
INTRODUCTION
In subverting attack on the computer network there is a need for mission critical control and safety systems. These systems are used where failure of the control system will cause serious problems including expensive downtime and possible hazards. Users are looking for systems that are reliable and safe. A system is said to be reliable if it fails very infrequently i.e rarely. A system is said to be safe if it fails in a predictable way when it fails -fail-safe i.e when it fails but it keeps on working as expected. The diagram below in Figure 1 shows a system operation that includes successful operation and the two primary failure modes of a control system, fail-safe (PFS), [1] the system fails but not down and fail-danger (PFD), here the system fails and collapse totally.
Figure 1: Control system operation/failure modes
One of the important issues to consider when looking for a control system that is safe and reliable is redundancy that is designed correctly considering high self diagnostic capability and high common cause strength.
WHY REDUNDANCY?
Redundancy is the installation of duplicate electronic or mechanical components or backup systems that are designed to come into use to keep equipment working if their counterparts fail. The effective use of redundant components has long been the solution of choice when attempting to build high reliability systems. The concepts of redundancy can be described using this illustration, two or three controllers were used to do the job of one, when one controller fails, another takes over, and the systems operate successfully. Repairs can be done on the failed controller [5] .
Redundancy can only be effective in control system designs, when the controllers have highly effective internal diagnostics and high common cause strength. The effect of redundancy under those circumstances Primary Fail Safe (PFS) and Primary Fail Danger (PFD) is shown in Figure 2 , it shows an increase in system reliability. 
Diagnostics and Redundancy
Implementations of redundancy in control systems involve some form of switching mechanism to select the output of a successfully operating controller to the final elements (valves). Often this switch depends on diagnostic information from the controllers to determine which output to select. When a diagnostics system does not detect a failure, it always resulted in a failed system. For example, there are two block controller model shown in Figure 3 . The controllers feed an output to a switch that selects an output for the system. The selection is based on two diagnostic signals that come from the controllers. If both signals indicate successful operation, the switch is free to select either output. If one output is bad, the other is selected. If both are bad, the output is programmed to either fail-safe or maintain last output whichever is appropriate to the application. A Markov model which is a mathematical model is been used in interpreting the redundant controller block, it states that a system fails if both controllers fail, the switch fails or there is an undetected failure in the controller selected by the switch.
MARKOV ANALYSIS
Markov analysis is a complex subject with many applications outside the field of engineering. Most technical libraries will have several books on the subject since it is an analysis method that can be applied to certain reliability problems. The method is based on an analysis of the transitions between system states. Markov analysis is illustrated below
The basis of a Markov model is the assumption that the future is independent of the past, given the present. This arises from the study of Markov chains -sequences of random variables in which the future variable is determined by the present variable but is independent of the way in which the present state arose from its predecessors. Markov analysis looks at a sequence of events and analyses the tendency of one event to be followed by another. Using this analysis, it is possible to generate a new sequence of random but related events, which appear similar to the original.
A Markov chain may be described as homogeneous or nonhomogeneous. A homogeneous chain is characterised by constant transition times between states. A non-homogeneous chain is characterised by transition rates between the states that are functions of a global clock, for example, elapsed mission time. A Markov model may be used where events, such as the failure or repair of an item can occur at any point in time. The model evaluates the probability of moving from a known state to the next logical state, i.e. from everything working to the first item failed, from the first item failed to the second item failed and so on until the system has reached the final or totally failed state.
System States and Truth Tables
A system state can be defined as a particular combination of the states of the elements comprising the system Goble et al., 
THE METHOD OF ANALYSIS
Lets Consider the system shown in figure 4 below, it comprises of 2 elements in standby redundancy. Let the failure rate of element 1 be λ 1 , and the failure rates of element 2 be λ 2 in the operational state and λp 2 in the standby state.
Figure 4: A Two Element Standby Redundancy System
Now this system can occupy one of four states:
(1) 1 and 2 up ≡ (1, 2) (2) 1 down, 2 up ≡ (1, 2) (3) 1 up, 2 down ≡ (1, 2) (4) 1 down, 2 down ≡ (1, 2)
The Common cause of failure Stress: In many industries, especially in the nuclear industry, it is well known that stress can fail multiple components in a redundant system, which is known as a common cause failure. While many different models have been created to understand this limitation in redundant systems, it shows clearly that if only a small percentage of the failure rate results in multiple failures, gains achievable via redundancy are limited. [2] A number of techniques have been recognized for reduction of common cause failures. These techniques can be grouped into categories that result in three basic rules Goble et al., 1996 : by applying these rules it will reduce the common stress between units, increase the diversity of the design, or raise the design's strength.
The Three Basic Rules to be used in Reducing Common Cause Failure

Reduce the Probability of Common Stress
One of the ways to reduce the common cause failure rate is to reduce the chance of two units being exposed to the same stress. When redundant units are physically separated, there is less coupling between units and less likelihood of a common stress. Most physical stress factors vary nonlinearly as a function of physical distance. Redundant units should not be physically mounted side by side. In such situations, coupling is maximized because the physical and electrical stress is nearly identical for each unit. Programmable Electronic Systems that have redundant equipment physically separated will be less susceptible to environmental common-cause failures simply because the common environment has been reduced. This can best be accomplished by mounting redundant equipment in different cabinets.
Design Redundant Units to Respond
Also, diversity which is a second common cause defense technique. Diversity is a concept in which different units are used together in a redundant configuration. The intent is that different units should not respond the same way to a common stress. The coupling is lowered because units designed and manufactured differently will have different strengths against a common stress.
In terms of environmental stressors, redundant components using different technologies may increase common cause strength if the designs respond differently to a common stress. For example, a mechanical unit backing up an electrical unit (a relay wired in series with a transistor) would be a good use of diversity. The use of different manufacturers of a common component may provide some benefit since this reduces the possibility of a common manufacturing defect, but significant benefits may not be achieved if both units respond to the same stress.
Make the Design More Rugged (High Strength)
The Equipment that is designed with an attributes that lower the single unit failure rate will also lower the common cause failure rate. Also, the Design techniques that provide greater resistance to stress, such as good heat sinking, coated circuit boards, rugged module covers, and secure mechanical connectors, will lower the component failure rate because these features increase strength. If a module is less likely to fail due to a certain stress level, it is less likely to have a common cause failure. All the things that increase strength decrease common cause susceptibility. The higher the design margin, the less likely is a common cause failure.
CONCLUSION
The operation and maintenance of a system can generate common cause failures. Incorrect commands sent to synchronously operating controllers will cause both to fail. Complex operations should be automated whenever possible. Fool proofing techniques can be used for both operations and maintenance. Repairable assemblies should be keyed so that modules and connectors cannot be installed improperly. Manual calibration should be eliminated if possible. Therefore, the paper is proposing that there is need for redundancy which is indispensable i.e is what we cannot do without in a world where technological risk must be closely regulated and where reliability is constructed as a variable that can be defined, calculated and designed. If all mentioned above can be incorporated into our systems, both mechanically and humanly it would enable the system to withstand, stress and pathogens that can knock out a single mechanisms.
This, in turn, greatly increases the difficulty of the adaptive search problem that the pathogen would faces when looking for a weak point in the defenses of the host (network, human body etc).
We started by proposing redundancy and still an ongoing project, research is still on how to introduce redundancy into the human immune system, so that when one system functioning fails and the other one will still be functioning. This will help in building a strategically robust control system that will be able to withstand stress. There is going to be a phase two of the paper.
